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ABSTRACT 
 
A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF DONORS’ AID TRANSPARENCY 
ON THEIR AID VOLUME 
By 
JO, WONGI 
 
While the international development cooperation community is bearing a double burden of 
increasing the volume of foreign aid and enhancing its effectiveness and accountability at the 
same time, this study aims to explore whether aid transparency of donor agencies, among other 
determinants of foreign aid, has any impact on their aid volume. Fixed effects regressions using 
panel data over 2011-2017 for 51 donor agencies in 36 donor countries are used in the analysis. 
The results find that donor agencies in more populated countries spare less aid budget, implying 
the existence of economies of scale. On the political side, donors with more women in 
parliaments tend to show higher generosity, while fractionalized opposition party has negative 
influence. In addition, pro-poor donors with larger government and social expenditure appear 
to also spend more for international redistribution. However, in contrast to existing studies, 
domestic inequality proxied by income held by the bottom quantile and Gini coefficient is 
examined to be positively correlated with foreign aid. Aid transparency of donor agencies, 
captured by Aid Transparency Index and its separate components, is found to be insignificant 
as determinants of aid allocation decisions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to study which factors determine the size of foreign aid provided to developing 
world by donor agencies. More specifically, this study tries to examine whether factors that 
have been considered to be influential in previous literature still apply to aid allocation in recent 
years; whether transparency of donor agencies, which is becoming increasingly important in 
securing aid effectiveness and accountability, also serves as another determinant of their 
generosity; and whether securing donor transparency can eventually provide the international 
development cooperation community with a basis for further scale-up. 
1.1. Why Volume of Foreign Aid Matters 
Despite the controversy over whether foreign aid is effective or not, the international 
development cooperation community has been trying to grow the pie—to raise the volume of 
foreign aid provided to improve the lives of underserved population of the world. Development 
assistance has been pursued as an obligation, in part, that members of an “interdependent world 
community” must carry,1 with the well-known 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) target 
proposed in the Pearson Commission in 1969.2  
The 0.7% ODA/GNI ratio has been widely accepted by donor countries as a major objective. 
As illustrated with a full line in Figure A below, official development assistance (ODA) has 
gradually expanded by far, especially since the beginning of the new millennium with the 
                                           
1 “If a rationale for aid can gain some support from the record, it remains that more compelling reasons must be 
adduced. There are at least two such. The first is a moral reason and is based on the universally accepted 
proposition that it is the duty of the fortunate to help those who need. Enlightened national interest, expressed 
in terms of an interdependent world community, is the second reason.” (World Bank. The Pearson Commission 
- July 2003. 2016. World Bank Group Archives Exhibit Series; No. 030.) 
2 The original target proposed by the Pearson Commission was to raise ODA to 0.7% of gross national product 
(GNP), and it was replaced by GNI from 1993 when OECD revised its National Accounts Statistics. (OECD. 
The 0.7% ODA/GNI target - a history. https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm.) 
2 
introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), although experiencing decreases 
in the late 1990s and 2007. Increasing by over 60% Since 2000, foreign aid has been a stable 
financing source for international development (OECD 2015). 
Figure A. Net Official Development Assistance 1960-2017 
(OECD Data, Net ODA statistics) 
 
However, the target has never been achieved among donors in a collective sense, as described 
with a dotted line in Figure A above. The average ODA/GNI ratio has long been stable around 
0.3%, for over a decade after 2005. Only 9 countries, by far, have provided aid more than 0.7% 
at least for one year: Denmark, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom (based on OECD Data, Net ODA 
statistics). 
Recently, the need for further increase in foreign aid has been raised with the adoption of even 
broader and more ambitious agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which is 
composed of 17 goals and 169 targets. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) estimated in a report that achieving SDGs would require 2.5 trillion dollars 
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annually in developing countries, to fill the financing gap from 2015 to 2030. (UNCTAD 2014) 
In this sense, through discussions on development financing that took place in Monterrey 
(2002), Doha (2008), and Addis Ababa (2015), donor countries have re-confirmed their 
commitments to reach the ODA/GNI ratio target, while emphasizing the importance of 
mobilizing various and unconventional sources of financing for development, such as financial 
resources at home, foreign investment, private flows, and trade, as well as innovative finance 
as described in Table A below (Park and Oh 2015). 
Table A. Comparison of Discussions on Financing for Development 
(Modified by Author from Kim et al. 2011) 
 
Monterrey Consensus 
(2002) 
Doha Declaration 
(2008) 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
(2015) 
A
ct
io
n
 a
re
a
s 
A. Mobilizing domestic 
financial resources for 
development 
B. Mobilizing international 
resources for development: 
foreign direct investment 
and other private flows 
C. International Trade as an 
engine for development 
D. Increasing international 
financial and technical 
cooperation for 
development 
E. External Debt 
F. Addressing systemic 
issues: enhancing the 
coherence and consistency 
of the international 
monetary, financial and 
trading systems in support 
of development 
A. Mobilizing domestic 
financial resources for 
development 
B. Mobilizing international 
resources for development: 
foreign direct investment 
and other private flows 
C. International trade as an 
engine for development  
D. Increasing international 
financial and technical 
cooperation for 
development 
E. External Debt 
F. Addressing systemic 
issues: enhancing the 
coherence and consistency 
of the international 
monetary, financial and 
trading systems in support 
of development 
G. Other new challenges and 
emerging issues 
A. Domestic public resources 
B. Domestic and international 
private business and 
finance 
C. International development 
cooperation 
D. International trade as an 
engine for development 
E. Debt and debt 
sustainability 
F. Addressing systemic issues 
G. Science, technology, 
innovation, and capacity 
building 
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1.2. Why Transparency of Foreign Aid Matters 
While bearing the burden of scale-up on one hand, the international development cooperation 
community is also facing greater demand for value for money—improving effectiveness and 
accountability of existing development aid. Donors have endeavored to utilize their limited aid 
in more efficient manners, through 4 times of the High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness from 
Rome (2002) to Busan (2011). 
Transparency, in particular, was suggested as one of the crucial factors to enhance aid 
effectiveness. Developed and developing countries gathered in Paris defined “lack of 
transparency”, together with corruption, as an obstacle that hinders public support and effective 
allocation of resources. Both donors and recipients committed to enhance transparency in using 
development resources, while the former, in particular, to reveal their development assistance 
by disclosing “transparent” information so that developing countries can report to their public 
and legislative body (OECD 2005). By calling for a specific action, the 3rd High-level Forum 
gave concrete shape to the commitment for transparent foreign aid with the adoption of Accra 
Agenda for Action: “donors will publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on 
volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure to enable more 
accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries” (OECD 2008).  
In order to implement the specific action, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) 
was initiated with participation of diverse stakeholders including donors, recipients, civil 
society, etc. IATI has established a platform for donors to publish data and information on their 
development assistance, so as to enable any stakeholders can easily access how aid is spent. In 
line with the initiative, Publish What You Fund (PWYF), a UK-based NGO has published Aid 
Transparency Index (ATI), to present transparency performance of donor “agencies” since 2010. 
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1.3. How to Measure Transparency as a Determinant of Foreign Aid 
This study examines the significance of donors’ aid transparency as one of determinants of 
their aid volume. Aid transparency is measured by ATI datasets published in the year of 2013, 
2014, 2015, and 2016 that share the same 39 component indicators in common. Methodology 
of how ATI is organized and measured is discussed in more detail later in Chapter 2. 
Aid volume is calculated by net ODA disbursement of each donor agency in relation to GNI of 
its country, captured in Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Other factors selected for potential determinants are 
measured by indicators mostly from OECD International Development Statistics (IDS); World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank; and Database of Political Institutions 2017 
(DPI 2017) of Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
The rest of this study is constructed as follows: Section 2 reviews which factors have been 
considered as determinants of donors’ aid volume in previous literature; Section 3 outlines 
theoretical background and draws out research questions; Section 4 specifies methodology and 
states measurements and sources of data used for analysis; Section 5 interprets results and 
presents findings; while Section 6 concludes and provides implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Literature on Determinants of Foreign Aid 
How is foreign aid allocated? In order to answer this question, most existing studies, from the 
early to even recent ones, have tried to examine how foreign aid was allocated among recipient 
countries (McKinlay and Little 1977; 1978; McGillivray and White 1993; Trumbull and Wall 
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1994; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Ali and Isse 2006; Clist 2011; etc.). It was because they were 
basically based on the perspective that aid is not determined by actual needs of recipient 
countries, but by unpredictable standards of donors—which have been, in part, political and 
strategic (UNDP 1992; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Factors commonly acknowledged by the 
previous studies includes colonial past, political alliances, democratic status, investment 
outlook, poverty, civil liberty, etc. 
Contrary to the extensive literature focusing on factors on the recipients’ side, much fewer have 
concentrated on how foreign aid was allocated within donor countries (Faini 2006). Beenstock 
(1980) and Mosley (1985) were among the first studies that paid attention to the question and 
examined factors affecting aid volume (Fuchs et al. 2014). More recently from the early 2000s, 
as the international development cooperation community has consistently called for scale-up 
of aid and put more emphasis on mutual accountability between donor and partner countries, 
more scholars have attempted analyzing what determines the portion of foreign aid within 
government budget, that is basically financed by taxpayers of each donor. 
Factors covered by selected previous literature can be grouped into 3 categories: economic 
factors; political factors; and social and other factors. In addition, in accordance with their 
significance as determinants of foreign aid, they can also be grouped into three different 
categories: factors with a positive relationship; factors with a negative relationship, and factors 
with a mixed or insignificant relationship, as summarized in Table B. 
2.1.1. Economic Factors 
(a) Income Level 
Development aid provided to developing economies is considered as a good for public interests 
that is supplied by governments of developed economies. (Fuchs et al. 2014). Mosley (1985) 
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argued that demands of the public, more specifically taxpayers, that provides financial sources 
for development assistance, should be taken into consideration, and the demand is determined 
by their judgement of whether they can afford the good or not. This is in line with the perception 
that foreign aid is a luxury good which demand rises more than proportionally as income does 
(Dudley 1979), and the logical framework of political systems which is discussed more closely 
later in Chapter 3 (Easton 1965). 
Previous studies have found that aid volume tends to increase alongside GDP per capita, in 
case when the correlation was statistically significant (Round and Odedokun 2004; Boschini 
and Olofsgård 2007; Bertoli et al. 2008; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Fuchs et al. 2014), although 
income elasticity of 0.49 indicated by Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) implied that foreign aid 
is closer to a normal good, rather than a luxury good. 
(b) Population Size 
Despite arguments that larger countries can provide more assistance to developing countries 
simply due to their sizes, or since smaller ones can “free-ride” on larger ones (Dudley 1979; 
Mosley 1985), empirical results from most previous literature suggested a negative correlation 
between population size of donors and their aid volumes (Round and Odedokun 2004; 
Zimmerman 2007; Bertoli et al. 2008; Dreher and Fuchs 2011). 
Round and Odedokun (2004) postulated the existence of economies of scale in providing aid: 
donors with larger population can take advantage of less administrative costs and lower 
monetary threshold, relative to their sizes. The negative impact of population size on aid 
volume was identified with all 22 donors examined in the study. Bertoli et al. (2008) argued 
that the relationship can be accounted for weaker willingness to redistribute based on higher 
heterogeneity and less cohesion within large populations. 
8 
(c) Economic Conditions 
As mentioned earlier, a large number of studies on foreign aid had long focused on its 
effectiveness or allocation among recipient countries, while taking its amount within donor 
budgets as pre-determined by political and commercial interests (Faini 2006). Relatively a few 
have devoted attention to donors’ economic conditions, including fiscal situation and 
macroeconomic constraints (Beenstock 1980; Round and Odedokun 2004; Faini 2006; 
Lundsgaarde et al. 2007; Bertoli et al. 2008). Governments experiencing heavier distress with 
fiscal balance were believed to be less generous to redistribution abroad (Round and Odedokun 
2004), and in line with the belief, debt and fiscal deficit were identified as explanation for 
declining foreign aid (Faini 2006; Dreher and Fuchs 2011). Macroeconomic environments, 
such as GDP growth rate, unemployment, output gap, and current account, have also been 
expected to affect aid volume (Beenstock 1980; Round and Odedokun 2004; Faini 2006; 
Lundsgaarde et al. 2007; Bertoli et al. 2008; Tingley 2010), and Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
argued that economic conditions cause tradeoff between domestic and international priorities. 
2.1.2. Political Factors 
(a) Government Ideology 
It has been generally acknowledged that right-wing governments tends to be less pro-poor 
domestically, and on the same lines, less generous in redistributing abroad (Round and 
Odedokun 2004; Fuchs et al. 2014). Left-leaning governments, on the other hand, are likely to 
exhibit higher donor generosity (Thérien and Noël 2000). This can be backed up by empirical 
results that discovered a negative correlation between right-wing government ideology and 
volume of foreign aid (Tingley 2010; Brech and Potrafke 2014). The opposite results, where 
being a right-wing government links to more commitments for foreign aid, were also identified 
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(Round and Odedokun 2004), which implies that development aid may have been used by 
right-wing governments as an instrument for political or commercial interests, “overshadowing” 
altruistic motivation of foreign aid (Round and Odedokun 2004; Fuchs et al. 2014). 
(b) Diverging Interests in Domestic Politics 
Not only whether a government is classified as right-wing or left-wing oriented, but also 
whether there are other political authorities that can exercise influence on decision making for 
aid allocation or not matters. Fuchs et al. (2014) and Round and Odedokun (2004) tried to 
weigh the impact of diverging interests in domestic politics by using indicators from the 
Database of Political Institutions 2001, such as indices of polarization, checks and balances, 
government and opposition fractionalization (Beck et al. 2001). The posited assumption was 
that the principle of checks and balances working around and/or within government would 
result in the reflection of diverging interests, which in turn increase budget allocation to foreign 
aid. Round and Odedokun (2004) found that the indicators, except opposition fractionalization, 
were effective in increasing aid volume of donors. The share of seats occupied by women in 
parliaments was also examined, and identified as a determinant of foreign aid, as Togeby (1994) 
argued that women in parliament tend to support increasing aid budget for international 
solidarity (Breuning 2001; Fuchs et al. 2014). 
(c) Pro-poor Spending 
Apart from the general perception that right-wing ideology provides less foreign aid, which 
can be diluted or regarded as ambiguous by strategic and economic interests, it has also been 
widely argued that governments in favor with domestic welfare and redistribution had higher 
propensity to redistribute abroad (Lumsdaine 1993; Noël and Thérien 1995). Government size 
that reflects the stance for domestic welfare was found to be positively associated with the scale 
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of development aid (Round and Odedokun 2004; Bertoli et al. 2008), while social spending 
proxied by nonrepayable subsidies and other transfers in relation to total government spending 
(Round and Odedokun 2004) or welfare expenditure as a share of GDP (Tingley 2010) showed 
a positive, but not statistically significant relationship. It was also discovered, however, that 
the link between public supports for domestic and international redistribution weakened, when 
the former took the top priority (Noël and Thérien 2002). 
(d) Strategic Interests 
Boschini and Olofsgård (2007), in a study on 17 OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) members for nearly 30 years from 1970 to 1997, found a positive correlation between 
foreign aid by donor countries and military expenditure made by the former Eastern Bloc 
countries. This provided a convincing answer to the question why aid volume significantly 
declined when Cold War ended in the 1990s, which suggested the loss of one of the important 
motivations for foreign aid. Round and Odedokun (2004) also argued that development aid is 
utilized in serving donors’ strategic and military interests with empirical results using military 
expenditure of donors as a share of GNI, and military personnel in relation to total labor force. 
Fuchs et al. (2014) tried to examine whether aid served military interests of 22 DAC member 
countries with the 2 proxies, but found they were insignificant. 
2.1.3. Social and Other Factors 
(a) Domestic Inequality 
Foreign aid can be regarded a public policy provided by governments of donor countries. 
Considering that governments, or donor agencies, are political system sourced by their 
taxpayers, the public, their policy decision making process should respond to demands and 
supply of the public, at least in principle. Therefore, it can be argued that foreign aid, like any 
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other public policies, would vary according to public opinions towards it. (Political systems 
around foreign aid and public support are discussed more closely in Chapter 3.) Mosley (1985) 
expected aid volume to decline with income inequality, since less equal societies are more 
unlikely to favor both domestic and international redistribution. Along with this postulation, 
Round and Odedokun (2004) and Bertoli et al. (2008) examined domestic inequality of donors 
using Gini coefficient and income held by the bottom quintile of total population, and found a 
negative relationship to foreign aid.  
(b) Peer Effect 
Round and Odedokun (2004) claimed that there is a strong evidence of peer pressure to be 
positively related to aid volume, which meant aid volume of a donor also increased or decreased 
along with those of other donors. Suggested causes were: multilateral aid provided jointly to 
international organizations including regional development banks and United Nations (UN) 
agencies; peer reviews among DAC member countries that enables collective improvement 
through recommendation and suggestions; and tendency to raise or reduce aid volume 
considering performances of other donors rather than focusing on mutual targets such as the 
0.7% ODA/GNI ratio. This argument has been supported by recent studies including Fort and 
Santiso (2011) that described the peer effect as “herding” among donors. Fuchs et al. (2014), 
however, identified a negative impact of peer pressure on aid allocation, implying the existence 
of “free-ride” by individual donors on other donors’ performance. 
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Table B. Determinants of Foreign Aid Identified in the Literature (Compiled by Author) 
Potential determinants Impact on aid volume observed 
Positive or mixed positive Insignificant Negative or mixed negative 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 
GDP per capita Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Dreher and Fuchs (2011) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
Mosley (1985) 
Faini (2006) 
Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
 
Population size  Fuchs et al. (2014) Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Dreher and Fuchs (2011) 
Debt  Fuchs et al. (2014) Faini (2006) 
Dreher and Fuchs (2011) 
Fiscal deficit  Mosley (1985) 
Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
Faini (2006) 
GDP growth rate Tingley (2010) Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
 
Output gap Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Faini (2006) 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Unemployment  Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
Beenstock (1980) 
Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
Current account Beenstock (1980) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
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P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
Right-wing government ideology Round and Odedokun (2004) Faini (2006) 
Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
Tingley 2010 
Brech and Potrafke (2014) 
Polarization Round and Odedokun (2004) Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Checks and balances Round and Odedokun (2004) Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Government fractionalization Round and Odedokun (2004) Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Opposition fractionalization  Fuchs et al. (2014) Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Women in parliament Breuning 2001 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
Lundsgaarde et al. (2007)  
Government size Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Dreher and Fuchs (2011) 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Social spending Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Tingley (2010) 
Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
 
Military expenditure / GNI ratio Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) 
Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Military personnel / total labor 
force ratio 
Round and Odedokun (2004) Fuchs et al. (2014)  
S
o
ci
al
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
Income held by the bottom quintile 
of total population 
Round and Odedokun (2004) Fuchs et al. (2014)  
Gini coefficient  Fuchs et al. (2014) Round and Odedokun (2004) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Peer effect Round and Odedokun (2004) Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) 
Bertoli et al. (2008) 
Fuchs et al. (2014) 
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2.2. Literature on Transparency of Foreign Aid 
What is transparency? According to Transparency International, an international NGO 
dedicated to combating corruption, transparency means openness. Transparency is enabling the 
public to be informed of activities of government, companies, or other organizations so as to 
secure their accountability and guard against corruption (Transparency International 2009). In 
a more practical sense, transparency is about disclosing information to the public on what has 
been done, for what purpose, by what method, and with how much resources. 
Like other determinants of foreign aid described earlier in Section 2.1, transparency has also 
been discussed mainly on recipients’ side. In terms of governance, lack of transparency or 
corruption in recipient countries was believed to interrupt effective use of foreign aid, since it 
leads to waste or diversion of the resources into activities that have less or even nothing to do 
with poverty reduction and economic development (World Bank 1991; Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Santiso 2001; OECD 2005; Collier 2007). In this sense, therefore, most studies have looked at 
transparency as a donors’ criterion for determining which developing countries should receive 
their limited foreign aid (Collier and Dollar 2001; Alesina and Weder 2002; Easterly 2007). 
Transparency of foreign aid on donors’ side has gained attention along with the discussion on 
aid effectiveness in the 2000s (Kaufmann 2009). A host of studies so far, however, have 
examined donor transparency, mostly as an element for improving aid effectiveness (Publish 
What You Fund 2009; Moon and Williamson 2010; Christensen et al. 2011; Gaventa and 
McGee 2013; McGee 2013). 
Only a few examined the relationship between donors’ transparency and their aid volume. 
Ghosh and Kharas (2011) pioneered the study of the effect of aid volume on donor transparency 
while ranking donors on transparency on their activities, although it was the opposite case of 
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this study. They examined the correlation between donor transparency and their aid volume, 
and identified that “no relationship” existed between the two factors. The correlation was rather 
weak at 0.11, which meant that larger donors are not necessarily more transparent. 
It is also notable that Faust (2011) studied the relationship between donor transparency and 
their aid allocation pattern. The result showed that donors with higher political transparency 
not only engaged more in promoting aid transparency, but also allocated more aid that meets 
the need of recipients. 
As described in the literature review earlier, there exists virtually no study that explored the 
impact of donor transparency on their aid volume, notwithstanding the fact that it is one of the 
few variables that donors can actually control. Most of the studies on aid allocation did not 
consider donors transparency as a determinant, although it seems fair considering that the 
discussion has been relatively new in the field of international development. Even the studies 
on donor transparency itself considered it only as one of the requisites for aid effectiveness. It 
can be acknowledged that there has been a lack of attempts to address how aid transparency of 
donors can work as a determinant of aid allocation within each donor country. 
2.3. Literature on Aid Transparency Index 
As the only measure of transparency performance of donor agencies, ATI is independently 
assessed based on IATI Standard. The main objectives of ATI are: 
• Estimating aid transparency status of the major donor agencies; 
• Tracking progress and encouraging peer learning, while holding donors accountable; and 
• Raising awareness of aid transparency at international, regional, and national level, based 
on existing standards for promoting open data including International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (PWYF 2018). 
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ATI assesses all types of official development finance (ODF)3 that includes ODA and other 
official flows (OOF) for development performed by bilateral donors, multilateral donors, and 
other donors including foundations, regional development banks, and UN agencies. In contrast 
to other international statistics or indicators, the subjects for assessment of ATI are donor 
“agencies”, rather than donor countries. PWYF explains that the reason is mainly in order to 
consider different features of development aid within a country. It is impossible for any two 
agencies of a same country to be scored equally, since they should be different in approaches 
and performances of publication, as well as the size of aid. 
The methodology of ATI measurement has been updated to monitor performances of donors 
more effectively, from its first publication in 2010 to the latest in 2018. After the first major 
revision made in 2012 based on consultation with donors and civil society, 39 indicators have 
been used in calculation for 4 consecutive editions from 2013 to 2016, until the second major 
update in 2017. The 39 indicators, mainly on how well donor agencies disclose information on 
their activities, were grouped into 3 categories: commitment to aid transparency, organization-
level publication, and activity-level publication (For more details, refer to Appendix B.) The 
change in ATI measurements is summarized in Table C below. 
Table C. Changes in Indicators and Assessed Agencies of ATI 2010-2018  
(Compiled by Author from PWYF) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 
Indicators 
measured 
7 37 43 39 39 39 39 35 
Donor agencies 
assessed 
30 49 72 67 68 22 46 45 
                                           
3 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms defines ODF as “used in measuring the inflow of resources to recipient 
countries: includes (a) bilateral official development assistance (ODA), (b) grants and concessional and non 
concessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and (c) Other Official Flows for 
development purposes (including refinancing Loans) which have too low a Grant Element to qualify as ODA.” 
(OECD. Official Development Finance (ODF). https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1893) 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
3.1. Systems Analysis on Foreign Aid 
This study tries to apply the topic—whether aid transparency of donors has any effect on 
volume of their development aid—into a basic systems model developed by Easton (1965). 
The model has been used and highly regarded as a framework for diverse fields, organizations, 
and time periods. The model posits a policy decision-making structure of any society where its 
political system interacts with inputs, outputs, and feedbacks (Vaughan-Games 1987).  
According to the model illustrated in Figure B below, a public policy is an output produced by 
decisions and actions of the political system that responds to inputs demanded by the society; 
and feedbacks on the policy formed by its success or failure again influence inputs of the next 
round that issue demands or support for the system; where this whole process is open and 
adaptive to intra- and extra-societal environments. 
Figure B. Simplified Model of a Political System (Easton 1965) 
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When the model is applied into the political environment of aid donors, illustrated in Figure C 
below, foreign aid is a policy output, produced by allocation decisions of government or aid 
agency; and feedbacks, formed based on the performance of foreign aid, are given to the public 
that again provides demands and support to the government or aid agency; where the whole 
process interacts to intra- and extra-societal environments, such as motivations, ideology, 
interests, and preferences, which Easton believed to have significant influence on the entire 
scheme (Vaughan-Games 1987). 
Figure C. Simplified Model of a Political System Applied to Foreign Aid Allocation 
(Modified by Author from Easton 1965) 
 
Therefore, it can be acknowledged that donors’ aid transparency—the extent to which donors 
disclose information on their aid activities—as feedback information to the public, can 
strengthen public support for subsequent activities. That is to say, with higher aid transparency, 
the public can trust that the government or aid agency is executing their tax in appropriate and 
understandable ways, which eventually provides more justification for increasing, or 
decreasing, of volume of foreign aid. 
19 
In addition to the common belief that transparency enhances public support, which was 
emphasized by numerous institutions including Transparency International and PWYF, there 
have been empirical researches that strengthens the reasoning. Gilens (2001) conducted a 
survey-based experiment on how the public holds different view about a certain policy 
depending on whether they are aware of specific information on policy or not. When 
respondents who had thought the government should “cut spending for foreign aid” were 
provided with the fact that the spending is less than 5%, their opposition fell by 13.6 percent 
points. 
According to a survey of Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), American citizens 
thought, in average, 10% of the government budget should be executed for foreign aid—which 
in fact was more than 10 times larger than actual spending. When informed of the fact, however, 
many of those who had believed that the government spent too much resources on foreign aid 
changed their initial stance (PIPA 2001). 
3.2. Public Support for Foreign Aid 
Based on the systems model applied into foreign aid allocation, higher transparency can 
provide stronger basis for supporting foreign aid policy of a society. However, does the 
enhanced public support result in decisions to allocate more budget to foreign aid? The 
argument on whether this link between public support for foreign aid and its volume exists or 
not has been discussed since the 1990s. (Kim et al. 2011) 
3.2.1. Positive Linkage between Public Support and Foreign Aid 
Lumsdaine (1993), based on the study on public opinions in 18 welfare states, claimed that 
foreign aid is not only based on strategic and economic interests, but also humanitarian interests 
called “moral vision”; and concluded that the public in favor with domestic redistribution 
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(social expenditure) also shows strong support for redistribution abroad (assistance to 
developing countries). Noël and Thérien (1995) backed up this claim by showing that 
governments with political orientation to domestic welfare are more committed in providing 
development assistance. Noël and Thérien (2002), in their subsequent study, found that 
attitudes of the public towards domestic and international redistribution are positively 
associated, only when considering a country’s domestic political and institutional context; the 
coherence was sustained in countries with relatively equal income distribution, but when 
domestic income redistribution has greater priority, support for foreign aid was weaker. 
Public opinions directly on foreign aid to developing world has also been argued to be 
positively influential to its amount. According to Randel and German (1996), it is more likely 
for developed countries, where public opinions on foreign aid are favorable, to make political 
decision to protect or increase their aid volume due to higher “political price.” German et al. 
(1998) analyzed all DAC member countries, and based on the individual country studies, 
indicated that governments’ decision making for aid allocation are influenced by public 
opinions towards international development cooperation.  
Stern (1998) observed that countries with higher public support for foreign aid have bigger 
shares of aid among their total government budget, and claimed a positive correlation between 
them which appeared particularly strong with Northern European nations—Denmark, Norway, 
Netherlands, and Sweden. The survey on 21 donor countries showed that the public who 
supports development aid increased to 80% in 1995 from 78% in 1983, and based on the survey, 
Stern claimed that there is no predominant influence of “aid fatigue”. 
While examining the “paradox” that the international development cooperation community 
faced with at the end of a century where the confidence and the doubt in foreign aid exited at 
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the same time, Thérien and Lloyd (2000) assessed public opinions on development assistance 
within donor countries as possibly the most significant factor that can draw more aid in the 
future. It was also mentioned, however, that educating the public on development aid should 
be followed, as it is an essential requirement in mobilizing their support and achieving 
sustainable social and economic development for all global citizens. 
3.2.2. Ambiguity in Linkage between Public Support and Foreign Aid 
On the other hand, there also has been skepticism on the belief, argued by studies mentioned 
earlier, that aid allocation is influenced by what the public thinks. McDonnell (2002) refuted 
Stern’s claim by arguing that public support for development aid towards developing world has 
been consistently high and remained stable. Based on the data collected from 13 OECD 
countries, the volume of development assistance in relation to their GNI has declined since the 
early 1990s. However, 80.4 percent of citizens in average has supported foreign aid, and there 
has been no aid fatigue observed “among the public”, which implies that it perhaps only existed 
within political systems. McDonnell pointed out that the figure was no different from the 
average of 80% in 1995 (Stern 1998), which does not seem much higher than 78% in 1983. 
Olsen (2001) also brought up questions to this “bottom-up” relationship. According to the case 
study on public opinions of five European donors, including Denmark, the European Union, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, it was rather seen as a “top-down” relationship: in 
the 1990s, the five donors lowered their aid volume although over 70% of the public supported 
maintaining existing levels. Olsen attributed this “missing” or misinterpreted link to highly 
centralized political systems and highly polarized social structure. 
Otter (2003) also studied trends in five donor countries, in attempt to explore the reason for the 
paradox, where donors decreased the level of providing foreign aid in spite of strong public 
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support. The relationship varied by country. Some cases demonstrated a positive correlation: 
aid volume increased or decreased in line with public support in Denmark and the United States; 
while others a negative or unclear correlation: aid size and public support varied in the opposite 
direction in Australia, Canada, and Japan. Otter concluded that there existed no definitive 
correlation based on the mixed results, and indicated that the reason can be decisions made 
with little consideration given to public opinions, in such “elite” realms as foreign aid. 
More recently, Hudson and van Heerde (2009) examined the association of public support and 
the size of development assistance in OECD countries over the period from 1990 to 2007, and 
Lee (2010) conducted both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses on 30 OECD countries 
including Republic of Korea, categorized into two groups by growth rate as an intervening 
variable from 1995 to 2008. Both reached to a conclusion of no convincing correlation found. 
3.3. Questions to be Examined in This Study 
Based on the theoretical background discussed above, this study aims to answer whether aid 
transparency performance of donor agencies functions as feedback information to the public 
that influences decision making of subsequent budget allocation for foreign aid; and if it does, 
how significant influence it retains among other determinants. In order to empirically examine 
the influence, therefore, this study attempts to address the following questions: 
• What determines volume of foreign aid? Do factors that have been influential still apply 
to development assistance in recent years? 
• Does aid transparency of donors influence volume of foreign aid? How significant is it 
compared to other determinants? Which component of donors’ aid transparency 
performances is most influential? 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Model Specification 
The baseline equation to examine determinants of foreign aid can be specified as: 
yijt = βxijt + μij + εijt (i = 1, 2, …, 51; j = 1, 2, …, 36; t = 1, 2, …, 7) 
where, 
i, j, t = donor agency, donor country, and year respectively; 
y = the dependent variable, the volume of donor agency’s ODA in relation to donor 
country’s GNI (ODAijt / GNIjt ratio); 
x = the vector of explanatory variables, including economic, political, social and 
other factors, and aid transparency; 
β = the vector of explanatory variables’ parameters; 
μ, ε =  unobserved individual effect; and error term. 
As implied by the specification above, time-series cross-sectional data over the period of 2011-
2017 are pooled across from 51 donor agencies in 36 donor countries. The data is unbalanced, 
however, since observations are not uniformly assembled for every donor agencies or years. 
Following the manner adopted by Round and Odedokun (2004), explanatory variables that are 
available for almost all organizations and years are included in equations repeatedly, while 
others which lack some observations are included in one equation at a time; in order to 
minimize possible multicollinearity and maximize observations for estimation (Round and 
Odedokun 2004). This study employs fixed effects regressions with the assumption of 
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unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity across donor agencies and years. 
4.2. Data Measurements and Sources 
This study analyzes the panel data of 51 donor agencies in 36 donor countries that have 
provided development aid from 2011 to 2017, and which amount of assistance provided was 
traceable and verifiable with OECD CRS. The list of donor agencies included is compiled in 
Appendix C, and all variables used in the analysis, with definitions and sources, in Table D. 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable 
In order to capture the volume of development aid made by each donor agency, the dependent 
variable was measured as the volume of net ODA disbursed by the agency as a share of the 
country’s GNI (ODAijt / GNIjt ratio). The ratio was calculated by Author’s own calculation, 
based on the amount of ODA flow provided by individual donor agencies extracted from 
OECD CRS with Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS) and GNI 
of each country collected from OECD IDS. 
4.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables applied in this study are categorized into 4 groups: economic, political, 
social and other factors, and aid transparency. Economic factors were captured mostly from 
OECD IDS and World Bank WDI. GDP per capita, in the natural logarithmic form, was used 
as a proxy for income level of donor countries; log of total population for population size; and 
debt, fiscal deficit, GDP growth rate, output gap, unemployment, and current account for 
economic conditions of donor countries. 
Most political factors, including government ideology, polarization, checks and balances, and 
fractionalization of government and opposition, were provided by IDB DPI 2017, while other 
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political factors, such as women in parliament, government size, social spending, and military 
expenditure and personnel were from OECD IDS and World Bank WDI. Gini coefficient and 
income held by the bottom quintile of total population, sourced from World Bank WDI, were 
used to estimate domestic inequality, while peer effect was also calculated by Author’s own 
calculation, based on the method used by Fuchs et al. (2014): the average of ODA 
disbursements of all other donor agencies as a share of the country’s GNI.  
ATI datasets from 2013 to 2016, provided by PWYF, were used as a proxy of aid transparency 
performance of each donor agency. As described in Chapter 2, ATI for the observed period, has 
been composed of 3 categories, including commitment to aid transparency, organization-level 
publication, and activity-level publication. In addition to ATI itself as a whole, the 3 
components were employed in the analysis respectively, in order to examine among different 
components of information disclosed by donor agencies, which one(s) have influence on the 
size of development aid.
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Table D. Data Measurements and Sources (Compiled by Author) 
Variables Label Definition (Format) Source URL 
Dependent variable: 
Aid volume of donor agency 
aid A donor agency’s net ODA disbursements, as a percentage of its 
donor countries gross national income (%) 
Own 
calculation by 
Author based 
on OECD 
CRS & IDS 
- https://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
- https://data.oecd.org/natincom
e/gross-national-income.htm 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 f
ac
to
rs
 
GDP per capita (log) gdpc A donor country’s gross domestic product divided by its total 
population (natural logarithmic form) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD 
Population size (log) pop A donor country’s total population (8natural logarithmic form) World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/SP.POP.TOTL 
Debt debt A donor country’s total gross government debt, as a percentage of 
its gross domestic product (%) 
OECD 
IDS 
https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-
government-debt.htm 
Fiscal deficit defic A donor country’s net lending or net borrowing, the fiscal position 
of government, as a percentage of its gross domestic product (%) 
OECD 
IDS 
https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-
government-deficit.htm 
GDP growth rate gdpg A donor country’s annual growth rate of gross domestic product, 
as a percentage (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
Output gap gap A difference between a donor country’s actual gross domestic 
product (actual output) and long-term forecast of gross domestic 
product (potential output), as a percentage of the potential output 
(%) 
Own 
calculation by 
Author based 
on OECD 
IDS 
- https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-
gdp-long-term-forecast.htm 
- https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross
-domestic-product-gdp.htm 
Unemployment unemp A donor country’s population unemployed but with capacity and 
willingness to work, as a percentage of total labor force (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS 
Current account curr A sum of a donor country’s foreign currency received and paid in 
trade of goods and services, as a percentage of its gross domestic 
product (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS 
27 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
Right-wing 
government ideology 
idgy A donor country’s political orientation of government in economic 
policy, with categorization into: right-wing or conservative (1); 
centrist or unclear (0); and left-wing or socialist (-1)  
IDB 
DPI 2017 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/d
atabase-political-institutions-
2017-dpi2017 (code: EXECRLC) 
Polarization polar A donor country’s polarization between political parties, with 
categorization into: polarized political orientation between chief 
executive’s party (president’s party or prime minister’s party) and 
other government parties (1-2); and no polarization with chief 
executive’s party holding an absolute majority (0) 
IDB 
DPI 2017 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/d
atabase-political-institutions-
2017-dpi2017 (code: POLARIZ) 
Checks and balances  check A donor country’s checks and balances within political decision-
making process calculated by the number of veto powers (1-8) 
IDB 
DPI 2017 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/d
atabase-political-institutions-
2017-dpi2017 (code: CHECKS) 
Government 
fractionalization  
govfr A donor country’s fractionalization in government parties, with 
possibility of randomly selecting two lawmakers within 
government parties, who are actually each from different political 
parties (%)  
IDB 
DPI 2017 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/d
atabase-political-institutions-
2017-dpi2017 (code: 
GOVFRAC) 
Opposition 
fractionalization  
oppfr A donor country’s fractionalization in opposition parties, with 
possibility of randomly selecting two lawmakers within 
opposition parties, who are actually each from different political 
parties (%) 
IDB 
DPI 2017 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/d
atabase-political-institutions-
2017-dpi2017 (code: OPPFRAC) 
Women in parliament wipar A donor county’s number of seats occupied by women in domestic 
parliaments, as a percentage of total number of seats (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS 
Government size gov A donor country’s total expenditure of central, state, and local 
governments, as a percentage of its gross domestic product (%) 
OECD 
IDS 
https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-
government-spending.htm 
Social spending subs A donor country’s government expenditure for social benefits 
including nonrepayable subsidies and other current transfers, as a 
percentage of its total expenditure 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/GC.XPN.TRFT.ZS 
Military expenditure / 
GNI ratio 
milex A donor country’s total expenditure on military activities, as a 
percentage of its gross domestic product (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS 
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Military personnel / 
total labor force ratio 
milps A donor country’s number of military personnel, as a percentage 
of its total labor force (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS 
S
o
ci
al
 a
n
d
 o
th
er
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rs
 
Income held by the 
bottom quintile of 
total population 
poor A donor country’s income held by the bottom quintile population, 
as its total income or consumption, with duplication for previous 
or subsequent years (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/SI.DST.FRST.20 
Gini coefficient gini A donor country’s Gini coefficient, as the degree of economic 
inequality, with duplication for previous or subsequent years (%) 
World Bank 
WDI 
https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/SI.POV.GINI 
Peer effect peer An average of net ODA disbursements of all other donor agencies 
except for the donor agency of concern, as a percentage of their 
gross national income (%) 
Own 
calculation by 
Author based 
on OECD 
CRS 
https://data.oecd.org/natincome/g
ross-national-income.htm 
A
id
 t
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
 
Aid transparency at A donor agency’s ATI as a whole index calculated by 39 
indicators with different weights 
PWYF 
ATI 
https://www.publishwhatyoufund
.org 
Commitments to aid 
transparency 
atcom A donor agency’s ATI as a component of commitments for aid 
transparency, calculated by 3 indicators with the aggregate weight 
of 10% 
PWYF 
ATI 
https://www.publishwhatyoufund
.org 
Publication – 
organization level 
atpor A donor agency’s ATI as a component of organization-level 
publication, calculated by 8 indicators with the aggregate weight 
of 25% 
PWYF 
ATI 
https://www.publishwhatyoufund
.org 
Publication – activity 
level 
atpac A donor agency’s ATI as a component of activity-level 
publication, calculated by 28 indicators with the aggregate weight 
of 65% 
PWYF 
ATI 
https://www.publishwhatyoufund
.org 
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5. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The results of the fixed effects regressions on 51 donor agencies for 7 years from 2011 to 2017 
are presented in Table E. As described earlier in Section 4.1, the 10 explanatory variables that 
are available for almost all aid agencies and years are included in Model 1 as a baseline model; 
while other variables lacking observations are included in each model at a time, from Model 2 
to 19. The results find that most of the explanatory variables, which appear to have statistical 
significance in the results of the pooled OLS regression presented in Appendix D, turn 
insignificant in the fixed effects regressions. Nevertheless, the results identify some 
determining factors, and verifies influence of aid transparency on aid of donor agencies. An 
evaluation of the specific factors as determinants of foreign aid is provided below. 
5.1. Economic Factors 
Among economic factors, only population size and unemployment rate turn out to play 
significant roles in aid allocation within donors. Donors’ income level, proxied by GDP per 
capita, which has been considered to have a positive correlation with aid volume, does not 
show any significance. This can be attributed to the specified model where individual country 
and time fixed effects are already considered, as Faini (2006) argued by the same result found 
with per capita income.  
It appears that population size has negative impact on aid volume, showing significant negative 
correlations in every equation. This reconfirms the correlation between the size of country and 
aid volume, and the existence of economies of scale due to advantages of administrative costs 
and lower monetary threshold, as examined by previous literature (Round and Odedokun 2004; 
Bertoli et al. 2008; Dreher and Fuchs 2011).  
There exist no signs that the factors representing donors’ economic conditions, such as debt, 
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fiscal deficit, GDP growth rate, output gap, and current account, affect foreign aid. The 
exception is unemployment. Although having significance at the 0.05 level or below, 
unemployment shows a negative correlation with aid volume, in most cases except those 
considering aid transparency factors. The results suggest that governments with stronger 
burden of domestic unemployment provide less development assistance, implying the “tradeoff” 
between priorities that Lundsgaarde et al. (2007) argued. 
5.2. Political Factors 
Most of the political factors, including right-wing government ideology, diverging interests in 
domestic politics, and strategic interests, fail to prove their impact on aid volume. However, 
variables with thorough observations, which are included in the baseline model, demonstrates 
their presence around decision making process for foreign aid allocation. 
Opposition fractionalization, or the number of political parties organizing the opposition party, 
is indicated as negatively correlated with foreign aid, with statistical significance in all models 
other than those considering aid transparency factors. This negative impact implies that it is 
more likely for the government to be less bothered by the fractionalized opposition, in making 
decisions for increasing donors’ aid volume. Higher percentage of seats held by women 
lawmakers in domestic parliaments is positively related to aid volume, having significance at 
0.05 level or below. The result seems to provide support for the argument that women are more 
likely to favor assistance for developing world, and their participation in politics increases 
donor generosity. 
It is also examined that countries allocating more financial resources for pro-poor purposes 
provide more resources for developing countries as well. When employed with both 
government size and social spending as proxies for domestic pro-poor policy, the models 
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indicate positive correlations with international pro-poor tendency, while showing statistical 
significance in most cases. 
5.3. Social and Other Factors 
Regarding the link between domestic inequality of donors and their aid volume, the models 
employed this study provide unexpected results, conflicting to existing arguments made by 
previous literature, such as Round and Odedokun (2004) and Bertoli et al. (2008). The results 
of Model 11 and 12 contradict the perception that domestic inequality is inversely correlated 
to international redistribution. While both variables are statistically significant at 0.05 level at 
least, income held by the bottom quintile of total population shows a negative correlation, and 
Gini coefficient presents a positive correlation, which suggests that: relatively equal societies 
(with higher income share of the bottom quintile) provide less aid for redistribution abroad; or 
relatively inequal societies (with higher Gini coefficient) provide more. 
Although peer effect has been detected, either positive or negative, by some of the existing 
studies, this study does not show convincing evidence of its existence. The impact of peer effect 
appears to be positive as expected in most cases, but statistically insignificant. Only in the case 
of employing 2-year lagged aid transparency (Model 15), peer effect turns significant at 0.05 
level of significance, and negatively correlated with aid volume. Based on this result, it can be 
argued that development aid of a donor agency is negatively correlated with performance of 
peer agencies, implying negative spillovers among donors. 
5.4. Aid Transparency 
In respect to the question whether aid transparency of donor agencies has any influence on their 
aid volume, the result does not suggest significant evidence. Transparency factors of donors, 
which appear to be significant and positively correlated with aid volume in the results of the 
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pooled OLS regression compiled in Appendix D, turn insignificant with the fixed effects 
regressions. According to Model 13 and 14, ATI as a whole, as well as its 1-year lagged term, 
is barely influential to decisions on aid allocation, in contrast to the systems analysis model 
and its application to development aid described in Chapter 3. However, the 2-year lagged aid 
transparency shows a negative impact with significance at 0.05 level, although its degree 
appears to be small. This might represent that more frequent or cumulative exposure to 
publications and references related to foreign aid, instead of adequate food for thought, 
amplifies the misconception that inordinate amounts of taxpayers’ money are being spent 
needlessly overseas. 
When ATI is employed into the equation as its components, there are no significant findings as 
well. While the pooled OLS regressions provide positive and significant coefficients to all three 
components including commitments to aid transparency, organization-level publication, and 
activity-level publication, the fixed effects regressions do not present the same relationship 
between disclosing information on aid activities of donors and raising their volume. 
These results provide stronger support to the argument claimed by previous literature 
mentioned in Chapter 3, that the link between stronger public support for development 
assistance and decisions to allocate more resources to foreign aid by political systems is 
indistinct (Olsen 2001; Otter 2003; Hudson and van Heerde 2009; Lee 2010). The postulation 
of the role of aid transparency as provision of feedback information to the public also cannot 
be proved by the empirical analysis of this study.
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Table E. Regression Results of Fixed Effects Model (Compiled by Author) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
gdpc -0.190 -0.233 -0.211 -0.132 -0.176 -0.163 -0.156 -0.190 -0.144 -0.191 
 (0.179) (0.250) (0.186) (0.250) (0.186) (0.209) (0.181) (0.179) (0.185) (0.179) 
pop -0.811** -0.900** -0.813** -0.869* -0.837** -0.849** -0.819** -0.814** -0.914*** -0.811** 
 (0.321) (0.371) (0.342) (0.481) (0.335) (0.375) (0.321) (0.325) (0.339) (0.322) 
gdpg -0.000363 0.000787 5.54e-05 0.00171 -0.000646 -0.000623 -0.000690 -0.000350 -0.000491 -0.000359 
 (0.00246) (0.00266) (0.00254) (0.00280) (0.00257) (0.00270) (0.00248) (0.00248) (0.00247) (0.00247) 
unemp -0.00845** -0.0104** -0.00951** -0.00707 -0.00859** -0.00854* -0.00764* -0.00843** -0.00670 -0.00842** 
 (0.00424) (0.00479) (0.00448) (0.00549) (0.00434) (0.00481) (0.00429) (0.00426) (0.00462) (0.00427) 
curr -0.00162 -0.00346 -0.00205 -0.00612 -0.00161 -0.00216 -0.00172 -0.00161 -0.00202 -0.00165 
 (0.00272) (0.00325) (0.00320) (0.00402) (0.00286) (0.00318) (0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00275) (0.00276) 
oppfr -0.0998** -0.0908* -0.0907** -0.138** -0.0904* -0.100** -0.0847* -0.101** -0.0975** -0.100** 
 (0.0445) (0.0473) (0.0457) (0.0606) (0.0491) (0.0501) (0.0459) (0.0495) (0.0446) (0.0451) 
wipar 0.00310* 0.00359* 0.00332* 0.00275 0.00299* 0.00329* 0.00331** 0.00311* 0.00295* 0.00308* 
 (0.00166) (0.00189) (0.00170) (0.00241) (0.00176) (0.00194) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00168) 
gov 0.00584** 0.00754** 0.00553 0.00878*** 0.00583** 0.00699** 0.00589** 0.00583** 0.00584** 0.00583** 
 (0.00251) (0.00328) (0.00348) (0.00318) (0.00260) (0.00290) (0.00251) (0.00252) (0.00251) (0.00252) 
subs 0.00338 0.00788** 0.00936*** 0.00900** 0.00334 0.00806** 0.00415* 0.00338 0.00304 0.00338 
 (0.00218) (0.00363) (0.00336) (0.00363) (0.00225) (0.00331) (0.00226) (0.00219) (0.00221) (0.00219) 
peer 0.215 0.357 0.255 0.352 0.237 0.348 0.244 0.212 0.201 0.217 
 (0.223) (0.278) (0.238) (0.260) (0.233) (0.263) (0.224) (0.227) (0.224) (0.224) 
debt  8.79e-05         
  (0.000630)         
defic   -0.00303        
   (0.00385)        
gap    0.00149       
    (0.00190)       
idgy     -0.00361      
     (0.00656)      
polar      -0.00565     
      (0.00817)     
check       -0.00860    
       (0.00641)    
govfr        -0.00308   
        (0.0417)   
milex         -0.0198  
         (0.0208)  
milps          -0.00376 
          (0.0528) 
Constant 15.56*** 17.26*** 15.51*** 15.55** 15.90*** 15.77*** 15.32*** 15.63*** 16.88*** 15.57*** 
 (5.169) (6.236) (5.503) (7.465) (5.413) (5.920) (5.175) (5.256) (5.351) (5.181) 
Observations 305 274 288 251 292 264 304 305 305 305 
R-squared 0.160 0.188 0.181 0.162 0.166 0.181 0.166 0.160 0.163 0.160 
Number of id 49 42 44 45 47 43 49 49 49 49 
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VARIABLES (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
          
gdpc -0.0631 -0.0875 0.514 0.140 -0.977 0.490 0.465 0.498 0.514 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.403) (0.349) (0.649) (0.398) (0.411) (0.398) (0.412) 
pop -1.190*** -1.196*** -2.966** -2.888*** -2.856*** -3.110*** -3.022** -3.020*** -3.136*** 
 (0.366) (0.373) (1.138) (0.716) (0.930) (1.136) (1.145) (1.131) (1.147) 
gdpg -0.000719 -0.000730 0.00409 -0.00252 0.00387 0.00392 0.00418 0.00444 0.00429 
 (0.00258) (0.00259) (0.00587) (0.00332) (0.00311) (0.00584) (0.00592) (0.00585) (0.00593) 
unemp -0.00779* -0.00788* -0.000532 -0.00980 -0.0221 -0.00169 -0.00103 -0.00127 -0.00227 
 (0.00436) (0.00438) (0.00903) (0.00829) (0.0139) (0.00902) (0.00916) (0.00899) (0.00919) 
curr -0.00257 -0.00158 -0.00309 0.00670 -0.0118* -0.00426 -0.00451 -0.00257 -0.00229 
 (0.00284) (0.00283) (0.00651) (0.00476) (0.00652) (0.00616) (0.00632) (0.00640) (0.00657) 
oppfr -0.0970** -0.0961** -0.0846 0.0632 0.0464 -0.0805 -0.0855 -0.0724 -0.0633 
 (0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0903) (0.126) (0.138) (0.0900) (0.0913) (0.0911) (0.0928) 
wipar 0.00357** 0.00400** 0.0112** 0.00414** 0.00137 0.0107** 0.0109** 0.0108** 0.0105** 
 (0.00172) (0.00175) (0.00493) (0.00195) (0.00298) (0.00491) (0.00499) (0.00491) (0.00499) 
gov 0.00537** 0.00631** 0.0209*** 0.0130** 0.00803 0.0211*** 0.0204*** 0.0212*** 0.0220*** 
 (0.00265) (0.00264) (0.00665) (0.00573) (0.00861) (0.00661) (0.00664) (0.00663) (0.00672) 
subs 0.00315 0.00361 0.0253*** 0.0146** -0.000146 0.0261*** 0.0251*** 0.0256*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00228) (0.00782) (0.00705) (0.00893) (0.00785) (0.00784) (0.00780) (0.00793) 
peer 0.260 0.224 0.615 0.574 -3.200** 0.422 0.493 0.671 0.599 
 (0.243) (0.242) (0.454) (0.432) (1.403) (0.421) (0.421) (0.445) (0.456) 
poor -0.0755***         
 (0.0279)         
gini  0.0206**        
  (0.00885)        
at   0.000446       
   (0.000755)       
at_1    1.92e-05      
    (0.000640)      
at_2     -0.00147**     
     (0.000629)     
atcom      -0.00476   -0.00533 
      (0.00475)   (0.00494) 
atpor       -0.000306  0.000110 
       (0.00163)  (0.00168) 
atpac        0.000891 0.000985 
        (0.000893) (0.000903) 
Constant 21.22*** 20.26*** 43.25** 46.69*** 59.35*** 46.02** 44.82** 44.31** 46.10** 
 (5.804) (5.785) (18.76) (11.55) (18.88) (18.69) (18.98) (18.60) (18.99) 
Observations 285 285 123 130 104 123 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.186 0.179 0.368 0.430 0.372 0.374 0.366 0.374 0.385 
Number of id 46 46 43 46 46 43 43 43 43 
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6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
By claiming that ODA is “dying”, Severino and Ray (2009) called upon the international 
development cooperation community to move from ODA to a new measurement of financial 
resources to fight global challenges. The claim seems to be soon supported by the emergence 
of new frameworks, such as total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD) which 
emphasizes the importance of mobilizing finances from unconventional sources. Nevertheless, 
ODA is remaining as a fundamental source of development financing, and expected to play 
significant roles also in the era of SDGs (ECOSOC 2016).4 This suggests that it is still 
important to explore the factors that affect the volume of development assistance. 
This study is an effort to verify determinants of foreign aid provided by donor agencies over 
the period of 2011-2017, including aid transparency which has been scarcely investigated as a 
determinant in earlier studies. The results confirm that some factors that were regarded as 
determinants of aid volume by previous literature still apply in the aid allocation within donor 
countries: population size, unemployment, diverging interests in parliaments, and pro-poor 
tendency are identified to have expected influences; while economic inequality in donors to 
contradict the expectation. 
Aid transparency of donor agencies, which is the major focus of this study, turns out to make 
little or no impact on their development aid. This result implies that aid transparency—or 
disclosing information on foreign aid—is not performing a role as feedback information to the 
                                           
4  At the 11th Seoul ODA International Conference, Thomas Gass, Assistant Secretary-General for Policy 
Coordination and Inter-Agency Affairs of the United Nations, highlighted six areas that ODA can be utilized 
more strategically in implementing SDGs including: long-term capacity building in developing countries; 
achieving accordance among different agendas; correcting market failures and unbalanced opportunities; 
catalyzing other financial sources; and supporting accountability and enhancing impact of partnerships. (The 
Future of International Development Cooperation: The Role of ODA in the Era of the Sustainable Development 
Goals. https://www.un.org/development/desa/statements/asg/mr-gass/2017/09/11th-seoul-oda-intl-conf.html.) 
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public well, which was described earlier in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it can also be argued that 
enhanced aid transparency of donor agencies strengthens misunderstanding of the public, and 
persuade decision makers to spare less budget, as shown in by the result of Model 15.  
As one of the first attempts to examine aid transparency of donor agencies as a determinant of 
foreign aid volume, this study leaves much for future studies. Due to its newness and continued 
improvements in measurements, only 4 years of observations on ATI from 2013 to 2016, which 
share the same 39 component indicators in common, are available, and used for analysis. Once 
more data is accumulated and more attention is given to ATI, its impact on aid volume can be 
clearly revealed. In addition, public support and aid quality are recommended to be investigated 
as separate variables in further analysis. There might exists an interaction effect among them: 
quality aid might positively relate with aid transparency to lead greater levels of budget 
allocation, whereas raised transparency of subpar aid might only persuade the public and other 
decision makers to reduce funding. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (Compiled by Author) 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
id 357 26 14.74026 1 51 
year 357 2014 2.002807 2011 2017 
aid 317 0.15388 0.229135 0 0.99 
gdpc_ln 356 10.45804 0.545817 8.856401 11.58506 
pop_ln 357 16.81121 1.663337 12.93908 19.59979 
debt 296 98.61269 47.77939 1.893522 238.1824 
defic 308 -2.82902 3.713832 -14.6786 13.83138 
gdpg 357 2.116106 2.346155 -9.13249 25.11725 
gap 270 8.015595 4.25933 -2.63608 19.64126 
unemp 345 8.149367 4.77933 1.635502 27.4662 
curr 343 0.9622 4.378414 -9.93158 13.32184 
idgy 343 0.180758 0.846031 -1 1 
polar 303 1.270627 0.923943 0 2 
check 354 4.062147 1.361794 1 8 
govfr 343 0.440702 0.239852 0 0.806423 
oppfr 357 0.315578 0.257029 0 0.824415 
wipar 357 24.89132 9.94857 7.9 44.7 
gov 356 32.80324 11.08809 3.895282 60.39658 
subs 356 56.9236 15.16173 14.95139 83.87896 
milex 351 1.758212 1.054199 0.3407 6.034686 
milps 357 0.90934 0.588858 0.31569 2.993491 
poor 322 7.36677 1.326033 4.9 9.7 
gini 322 33.00062 4.149796 24.9 41.5 
peer 357 0.155404 0.027225 0.107079 0.19594 
at 134 36.09683 23.37808 0 89.6 
at_1 134 36.09683 23.37808 0 89.6 
at_2 108 32.69722 22.75327 0 88.9 
atcom 133 4.503759 2.328818 0 9.8 
atpor 133 10.55508 5.723194 1.25 24.81989 
atpac 133 21.30624 16.74082 0 63.1 
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Appendix B. Indicators, Grouping, and Scoring Approach of ATI 2013-2016 (PWYF 2013) 
Category Sub-category Indicator name Scoring approach Weight 
Commitment 
to aid 
transparency 
Commitment 1. Quality of FOI legislation (FOIA) Graduated based on the score given in Right To Information (RTI) 
Rating (see: http://www.rti-rating.org/). The complete approach to 
assessing and scoring FOIA and disclosure policy quality can be 
found in the technical paper available online. 
3.33% 
2. Implementation schedules Graduated based on the total score received out of 100 based on 
analysis of Busan common standard/IATI implementation 
schedules. 
3.33% 
3. Accessibility  Graduated based on three criteria: allows free bulk export of data; 
provides disaggregated, detailed data on activities; and data is 
released under an open licence. Each criterion carries 33.33% of the 
total possible score on this indicator. 
3.33% 
Publication – 
Organisation 
level 
Planning 4. Strategy Graduated based on accessibility 2.50% 
5. Annual report Graduated based on accessibility 2.50% 
6. Allocation policy Graduated based on accessibility 2.50% 
7. Procurement policy Graduated based on accessibility 2.50% 
8. Strategy (country) Graduated based on accessibility 2.50% 
Financial 9. Total organisation budget Graduated based on format and number of years for which data is 
provided 
4.17% 
10. Disaggregated budget Graduated based on format and number of years for which data is 
provided 
4.17% 
11. Audit Graduated based on accessibility 4.17% 
Publication – 
Activity level 
Basic activity 
information 
12. Implementer Graduated based on format 1.63% 
13. Unique ID Graduated based on format 1.63% 
14. Title Graduated based on format 1.63% 
15. Description Graduated based on format 1.63% 
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16. Planned dates Graduated based on format 1.63% 
17. Actual dates Graduated based on format 1.63% 
18. Current status Graduated based on format 1.63% 
19. Contact details Graduated based on format 1.63% 
Classifications 20. Collaboration type Graduated based on format 1.86% 
21. Flow type Graduated based on format 1.86% 
22. Aid type Graduated based on format 1.86% 
23. Finance type Graduated based on format 1.86% 
24. Sectors Graduated based on format 1.86% 
25. Sub-national location Graduated based on format 1.86% 
26. Tied aid status Graduated based on format 1.86% 
Related 
documents 
27. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Graduated based on accessibility  2.17% 
28. Evaluations Graduated based on accessibility 2.17% 
29. Objectives Graduated based on accessibility 2.17% 
30. Budget docs Graduated based on accessibility 2.17% 
31. Contracts Graduated based on accessibility 2.17% 
32. Tenders Graduated based on accessibility 2.17% 
Financial 33. Overall cost Graduated based on format 3.25% 
34. Planned expenditures Graduated based on format 3.25% 
35. Actual expenditures Graduated based on format 3.25% 
36. Budget Identifier (Budget ID) Graduated based on format 3.25% 
Performance 37. Results Graduated based on format 4.33% 
38. Impact appraisals Graduated based on accessibility 4.33% 
39. Conditions Graduated based on accessibility 4.33% 
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Appendix C. Donor Agencies Included in Analysis (Compiled by Author) 
 Country Agency 
1 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
(former Australian Agency for International Development) 
2 Austria Austrian Development Agency 
3 Belgium Directorate General for Cooperation and Development 
4 Bulgaria Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
5 Canada Global Affairs Canada 
(former Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, and 
Canadian International Development Agency) 
6 Cyprus CyprusAid 
7 Czech Republic Czech Development Agency 
8 Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
9 Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
10 Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
11 France French Development Agency 
12 France Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
13 France Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industry 
14 Germany GIZ 
15 Germany KfW 
16 Germany Federal Foreign Office 
17 Greece HellenicAid 
18 Hungary Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
19 Ireland Irish Aid 
20 Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(former Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo) 
21 Japan Japan International Cooperation Agency 
22 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
23 Korea Economic Cooperation Development Fund 
24 Korea Korea International Cooperation Agency 
25 Latvia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
26 Lithuania Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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27 Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
28 Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
29 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
30 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
31 Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
32 Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
33 Portugal Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance 
34 Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
35 Slovakia Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation 
36 Slovenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
37 Spain Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation 
38 Spain Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 
39 Sweden Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency 
40 Switzerland Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
41 United Arab Emirates Department of Finance 
42 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
43 United Kingdom Department for International Development 
44 United Kingdom Department of Energy and Climate Change 
45 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
46 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
47 United States Department of Defense 
48 United States Department of State (INL Bureau) 
49 United States Department of the Treasury (Office of Technical Assistance) 
50 United States Millennium Challenge Corporation 
51 United States U.S. Agency for International Development 
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Appendix D. Regression Results of Pooled OLS (Compiled by Author) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
gdpc 0.256*** 0.315*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.282*** 0.332*** 0.253*** 0.262*** 0.255*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0238) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0213) (0.0265) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0216) 
pop -0.0641*** -0.0756*** -0.0703*** -0.0777*** -0.0672*** -0.0652*** -0.0669*** -0.0613*** -0.0703*** -0.0641*** 
 (0.00809) (0.0105) (0.00933) (0.00843) (0.00811) (0.00892) (0.00887) (0.00830) (0.00922) (0.00808) 
gdpg -0.00927** -0.0111** -0.0111*** -0.00731* -0.0116*** -0.0128*** -0.00976** -0.00886** -0.00916** -0.00797* 
 (0.00424) (0.00437) (0.00418) (0.00414) (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00430) (0.00424) (0.00423) (0.00436) 
unemp -0.00753*** -0.00633*** -0.00444* -0.00530** -0.00689*** -0.00727*** -0.00759*** -0.00784*** -0.00739*** -0.00823*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00244) (0.00238) (0.00214) (0.00211) (0.00211) (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00211) (0.00218) 
curr 0.00749*** 0.00636** 0.00551** 0.00903*** 0.00820*** 0.00985*** 0.00723*** 0.00605** 0.00811*** 0.00659*** 
 (0.00225) (0.00254) (0.00256) (0.00228) (0.00226) (0.00235) (0.00228) (0.00245) (0.00229) (0.00236) 
oppfr -0.0738 -0.157*** -0.134** -0.113** -0.0413 -0.105* -0.0871* -0.0744 -0.0665 -0.0629 
 (0.0491) (0.0560) (0.0533) (0.0545) (0.0506) (0.0555) (0.0524) (0.0490) (0.0493) (0.0498) 
wipar 0.00447*** 0.00447*** 0.00363*** 0.00478*** 0.00386*** 0.00598*** 0.00439*** 0.00426*** 0.00469*** 0.00494*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00139) (0.00114) (0.00118) (0.00112) (0.00125) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00117) 
gov -0.00155 -0.00133 -0.00148 -0.00101 -0.00255** -0.00172 -0.00174 -0.00188* -0.00173 -0.00181 
 (0.00108) (0.00111) (0.00109) (0.00108) (0.00113) (0.00120) (0.00111) (0.00110) (0.00109) (0.00110) 
subs -0.00235*** -0.00249*** -0.00251*** -0.00227*** -0.00227*** -0.00284*** -0.00225*** -0.00256*** -0.00218*** -0.00232*** 
 (0.000798) (0.000798) (0.000790) (0.000825) (0.000794) (0.000849) (0.000811) (0.000809) (0.000807) (0.000798) 
peer 0.324 0.298 0.579* -0.919** 0.385 0.552 0.317 0.357 0.310 0.374 
 (0.326) (0.351) (0.337) (0.407) (0.328) (0.340) (0.327) (0.326) (0.326) (0.328) 
debt  -0.000258         
  (0.000282)         
defic   0.00747**        
   (0.00359)        
gap    -0.0123***       
    (0.00257)       
idgy     0.00607      
     (0.00973)      
polar      -0.0210     
      (0.0131)     
check       0.00598    
       (0.00779)    
govfr        0.0672   
        (0.0453)   
milex         0.0184  
         (0.0132)  
milps          0.0231 
          (0.0185) 
Constant -1.336*** -1.720*** -1.824*** -1.452*** -1.537*** -2.131*** -1.277*** -1.452*** -1.267*** -1.468*** 
 (0.257) (0.318) (0.290) (0.279) (0.263) (0.350) (0.269) (0.268) (0.261) (0.278) 
           
Observations 305 274 288 251 292 264 304 305 305 305 
R-squared 0.629 0.673 0.676 0.712 0.651 0.688 0.629 0.632 0.631 0.631 
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VARIABLES (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
          
gdpc 0.241*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.181*** 0.137*** 0.243*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0386) (0.0316) (0.0304) (0.0382) (0.0396) (0.0390) (0.0383) 
pop -0.0739*** -0.0704*** -0.0858*** -0.0721*** -0.0567*** -0.0796*** -0.0845*** -0.0860*** -0.0820*** 
 (0.00911) (0.00946) (0.0150) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0149) 
gdpg -0.00669 -0.00741 0.00236 -0.00911 -0.00276 0.00236 0.00155 0.00463 0.00175 
 (0.00451) (0.00452) (0.0111) (0.00562) (0.00558) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
unemp -0.0107*** -0.00862*** -0.00792** -0.00758** -0.00539 -0.00750** -0.00960** -0.00803** -0.00714* 
 (0.00262) (0.00250) (0.00381) (0.00358) (0.00374) (0.00377) (0.00387) (0.00385) (0.00380) 
curr 0.00748*** 0.00634** 0.00987** 0.00828** 0.00549 0.0104*** 0.00828** 0.00939** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00255) (0.00384) (0.00349) (0.00358) (0.00380) (0.00389) (0.00387) (0.00382) 
oppfr -0.114** -0.111** -0.151* -0.0568 -0.0736 -0.146* -0.164* -0.153* -0.143* 
 (0.0528) (0.0533) (0.0869) (0.0730) (0.0753) (0.0858) (0.0891) (0.0878) (0.0860) 
wipar 0.00719*** 0.00609*** 0.00422* 0.00327* 0.00250 0.00443** 0.00563** 0.00463** 0.00382* 
 (0.00150) (0.00149) (0.00217) (0.00188) (0.00185) (0.00210) (0.00216) (0.00218) (0.00216) 
gov -0.000599 -0.00138 0.00142 0.00104 0.000615 0.00102 0.000569 0.00118 0.00147 
 (0.00126) (0.00124) (0.00189) (0.00175) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00191) (0.00190) (0.00187) 
subs -0.00269*** -0.00249*** -0.00115 -0.000577 0.000110 -0.00128 -0.00164 -0.00107 -0.00114 
 (0.000824) (0.000820) (0.00118) (0.00109) (0.00111) (0.00117) (0.00121) (0.00120) (0.00118) 
peer 0.544 0.396 0.671 0.794 -10.89*** 0.623 0.0943 0.753 0.766 
 (0.362) (0.361) (0.559) (0.817) (2.528) (0.547) (0.554) (0.576) (0.585) 
poor -0.0186*         
 (0.0112)         
gini  0.000588        
  (0.00351)        
at   0.00304***       
   (0.000777)       
at_1    0.00310***      
    (0.000720)      
at_2     0.00137*     
     (0.000762)     
atcom      0.0303***   0.0229** 
      (0.00705)   (0.00936) 
atpor       0.00839***  0.000717 
       (0.00287)  (0.00371) 
atpac        0.00383*** 0.00158 
        (0.00108) (0.00147) 
Constant -0.970*** -1.196*** -1.178** -0.755* 0.961* -1.265** -1.111** -1.206** -1.243** 
 (0.303) (0.273) (0.543) (0.414) (0.511) (0.537) (0.559) (0.549) (0.540) 
          
Observations 285 285 123 130 104 123 123 123 123 
R-squared 0.642 0.639 0.701 0.662 0.697 0.708 0.684 0.694 0.713 
 
